Stock Market Dynamics and the Central Bank in a General Equilibrium Model by Ilomäki, Jukka & Laurila, Hannu
T A M P E R E  E C O N O M I C  W O R K I N G  P A P E R S
STOCK MARKET DYNAMICS AND THE CENTRAL BANK
IN A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
Jukka Ilomäki
Hannu Laurila
Working Paper 115
May 2017
FACULTY OF MANAGEMENT
FI-33014 UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE, FINLAND
ISSN 1458-1191
ISBN 978-952-03-0459-1
1 
 
Stock Market Dynamics and the Central Bank in a General Equilibrium 
Model 
Jukka Ilomäki 
Hannu Laurila 
 
Abstract 
We introduce a general equilibrium model with potentially inefficient stock markets 
consisting of asymmetrically informed investors. Prices are sticky in the goods market, 
but the labor market adjusts perfectly. The central bank aims to maximize the life-time 
wealth of the households in every period by keeping inflation in the steady state and stock 
markets in the fair value by adjusting the rate of return on risk-free investments. We find 
that the “leaning against the wind” policy works, which means that positive stock market 
bubbles can be eliminated by raising the risk-free rate.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Bean (2004), Roubini (2006) and Yellen (2010) argue that the central bank should intervene in 
the stock markets to prevent bubbles. On the other hand, Bernanke and Gertler (2001), 
Greenspan (2004) and Posen (2006) suggest that the central bank should focus on inflation 
targeting and stable growth in real economy and leave the stock markets monitoring for 
investors. 
 Conlon (2015) argues that the central bank should intervene in the stock markets if it has 
private information about the bubble, whereas an intervention might make things even worse 
without such information. Taylor (2014) argues that unusually low U.S. interest rate in the 
2000s is the key factor in the housing boom and financial crisis afterwards.  However, Gali 
(2014; 2016) argue that the central bank should tackle a positive bubble by lowering the risk-
free rate. This is because the bubble component does not have the discounting component, but 
the bubble develops at the rate of interest rate.  
Samuelson (1973) shows that the equilibrium stock price (Pt) is equal to the expected 
discounted dividends to the shareholder, that is the fundamental value (Vt). According to 
standard financial theory (Tobin 1958, Sharpe 1964)), investors allocate their investments 
between risk-free and risky assets. If the risk-free rate is low/high then investors shift their 
wealth to/from the risky assets. This suggests that if the stock markets equilibrium price (Pt) is 
above its fundamental value (Vt), the central bank should lift the risk-free rate to nudge investors 
to shift their asset from risky to risk-free asset. This is the so called “leaning against the wind” 
policy.  
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However, according to Gali, leaning against the wind does not work, at least when investors 
agree with the bubble component, because it does not have a discounting factor in its pricing. 
This is an important note because, in the (2014) Gali model, market participants are aware of 
the bubble and include it in their rational expectations. Thus, the bubble inflates with the risk-
free rate. Note that there are other meanings to the leaning against the wind policy in the 
literature such that Svensson (2016), where the central bank is targeting higher interest rate than 
what is justified by inflation targeting without taking any effect on financial markets bubbles 
into account. 
 
Inspired by striking result of Gali (2014) and by the conclusions of Conlon (2015), we 
investigate whether the central bank should or not intervene in the stock market with private 
information about the bubble. We construct a general equilibrium closed economy model with 
sticky prices in the goods market and flexible wages in the labor market.  In Gali (2014) all 
investors notice the bubble, but we construct an economy with asymmetric information among 
investors. That is µ of the investors recognize the real value of the risky asset tV , and 1-µ 
estimate in from past values.  
 
The central bank aims to maximize the aggregate real incomes of the households knowing that 
infinite bubbles are impossible. Thus, the bank targets on constant inflation rate  , and aims 
to stabilize all bubbles in the aggregate stock markets. We also assume that the central bank 
observes tV , and knows that an infinite bubble is impossible. In addition, we have a common, 
exogenous and non-stationary technology component in the production function that makes 
dividends, consumption, and the production itself non-stationary in the general equilibrium. 
This constitutes permanent shocks into the general equilibrium. 
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The key issue is the possibility of bubbles, defined by tt VP  . Tirole (1982) shows that tt VP   
in the rational expectations equilibrium with long-lived risk averse investors so that infinite 
bubbles are impossible, while Tirole (1985) argues that, in an overlapping generations model 
with short lived investors and infinitely lived assets bubbles are possible so that tt VP   may 
occasionally happen, because the bubbly economy can be passed on to the future generations. 
However, Santos & Woodward (1997) indicates that bubbles are impossible in rational markets 
only in the long run, but that there is a possibility of tt VP  in the short run. 
We find that the best policy for the central bank is to aim for steady state inflation and to reduce 
positive/negative bubbles in the stock markets by lifting/reducing the nominal risk-free rate. 
That is we prove the optimality of the leaning against the wind policy, when the risk averse 
households have asymmetric information about the value of the aggregate risky asset, the 
central bank observes the true value of the asset, the technology component of the firms follows 
a non-stationary process, and the households have a short investing horizon. Section 2 defines 
the model, the equilibrium conditions, and the analysis of best monetary policy and section 3 
concludes.  
2 The Model 
 
The model extends the stock market model of Ilomäki and Laurila (2017) to a closed general 
equilibrium model with reference to Gali (2014). In the model, there is an infinite set of 
atomistic households that live for two periods, investing and working in period one, and 
consuming in period two. In their investment decisions, the households act as constant absolute 
risk-averse (CARA) investors.  
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There is a set of infinitely lived firms, whose shares constitute the aggregate of risky assets in 
the economy. The risk-free alternative yields the nominal rate fn
tr , which is determined by the 
central bank. The central bank targets on a constant inflation rate  , and aims also to prevent 
all bubbles in the aggregate stock markets. The initial wealth of the households is .ytw  In the 
model, the portfolio choice is simplified, because the assumption of two-period lived CARA 
investors omits the possibility of hedging against changes in expected returns, and because the 
assumption of an infinitely lived risky asset constitutes limits for arbitrage in the overlapping 
generations model (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
The households have asymmetric information about the aggregate dividends in the stock market 
so that 0< <1 of them are informed about future aggregate dividend 1tD , and 1  of them 
are uninformed in every period. The source of the dividends is the following. Each monopolistic 
firm produces a differentiated good,    
)()( iNGiY ttt       (1) 
where )(iYt is the output of firm i , and )(iN t  is the labor input of firm i ,  where  1,0i . tG  
represents the identical (for all firms) technology that evolves exogenously over time. The 
natural logarithm of tG  follows random walk,  
G
ttt eGG  1lnln ,      (2) 
where ),0(~ 2d
G
t WNe  . Each firm sets its price for its good in order to maximize profits subject 
to the demand constraint  
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We assume that the net profits, )()()( iiYi ttt   , where  denotes the firm’s production 
costs, are paid out as dividend tD . Equation (2) being non-stationary (integrated in order one so 
that )1(I ) means that the change in tD  is permanent. This is because the non-stationary 
component in Equation (1) makes )(iYt  non-stationary in time. Since )1(~ IGt , )1(~)( IiYt . 
This indicates that the change of the net profits )(it is a martingale difference with 
0))((1  iE tt  . 
The history of equilibrium prices, the risk-free rate fn
tr and the current aggregate dividend Dt 
are common information to all households, but the young informed households have private 
information about 1tD . This is reasoned by private connections to the firms, which makes 
their knowledge about the performance of the firms superior compared to the uninformed ones.     
For simplicity, the excess returns for the aggregate risky asset are assumed normally distributed, 
short selling is available to young households, and there are no transaction costs. Note that the 
assumption of normally distributed excess returns implies constant conditional variance in the 
risk premium of investors.  
Young households sell their labor inelastically against wage tW . Households use all their assets 
in the consumption of goods in the second period: 
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Identity (4) indicates that there is a continuum of differentiated goods available for old 
households to consume, each produced by a different firm. e  denotes constant elasticity of 
substitution (assumedly 1e ), and goods are indexed by  1,0i . Thus, the aggregate price 
index in every period reads 
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We define the gross real risk-free rate as 
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which indicates that the net nominal risk-free rate is 
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2.1  Stock market equilibrium 
 
The market clearing condition for the risky asset reads 0 
y o
oy sx , where xy refers to total 
demand of the stock by young investors, and so is the total supply of the stock by old investors. 
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The optimal demand decisions produce the equilibrium price in period t thus fulfilling the 
market clearing condition. This happens because the old investors have to close their position 
to consume in the second period. In addition, the market clearing condition indicates that the 
demand per share equals unity in the equilibrium. 
A young investor maximizes his/her utility from period 2 consumption by maximizing life-time 
incomes, that is by optimizing on the investments in the financial markets. The maximization 
problem reads 
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where yt is the information set, v > 0 is the coefficient of risk aversion, 1tc  is consumption 
when old, y
tw is the amount of initial wealth, and 
fx and rx denote the amount of money 
invested in risk-free and risky assets, respectively. The net excess return on a risky share is  
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Assuming normally distributed extra consumption, taking expectations in Equation (6) and 
plugging the consumption constraint into the utility function yields  
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where 2r is the variance of excess returns. However, since informed investors have better 
information about risky assets, it must be that 22 ruri   . Note that, since the investors observe
fn
tr , its variance is zero. Maximizing (7) with respect to xr, using Equation (6) and noting that 
the demand per risky asset’s share is one in the equilibrium, the first order condition reads 
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denotes the risk premium. Manipulation of Equation (8) yields 
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for the pricing rule of the risky asset. After solving Equation (10) forward for k  periods, we 
have 
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from which  the second term on the right hand side shrinks to zero as the horizon k  increases, 
indicating that 
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Recalling the properties of random walk, the change in the dividend at time t  is permanent, and 
the rational choice represented by Equation (11) results over time in the perpetuity model, 
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where 2ri  is the variance of the informed investors’ excess returns. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that Equation (12) reflects the fundamental value of the risky asset, and that the 
pricing pattern of the informed investors follows it.  
In any period t, the uninformed investors observe the current dividend Dt and the risk-free rate. 
Hence, the rational choice of the uniformed investors gives 
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where 2
ru  is the variance of the uninformed investors’ excess returns. Using equations (12) 
and (13), and recalling that µ is the share of the informed households and 1-µ is the share of the 
uninformed households, the aggregate pricing rule for the risky asset in the financial market 
reads   
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The market price given by equation (14) results from the asymmetry of information among the 
investors.  
 
Proposition: If the risk-free rate rises/falls, the equilibrium price reduces/increases, ceteris 
paribus. 
Proof: Differentiate Equation (14) against tP  and 
fn
tr , manipulate, and get 
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The effect is clearly negative, since both terms on the right-hand side are negative, Equation 
(15) shows that, if the risk-free rate rises/falls, the equilibrium aggregate stock price falls/rises 
thus eliminating the bubble. Q.E.D. 
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Next, consider an alternative case, where the uninformed households operate as technical 
traders and price their offers according to past prices. Manipulating Equation (8), and taking 
one step backwards in prices and in dividend yields produces 
ttru
fn
t
u
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2 )1(  .    (16) 
Using Equations (12) and (16), the aggregate pricing rule in the financial market reads   
 ttrufnttt DPrVP  12 )1()1(  .  (17) 
Corollary: If the uninformed investors operate as technical traders, the basic result remains 
the same. 
Proof: Differentiate Equation (17) against tP  and 
fn
tr , manipulate, and get 
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 , which says that the equilibrium price falls 
if the weighted dividend return is larger than the squared net required return of informed 
investors. The condition is reasonable in general, but it adds in defining the regime, where the 
leaning against the wind policy works. However, that the uninformed investors operate as 
technical traders means that there is a possibility of rapidly growing bubble conditions, because 
the discounting factor is absent in Equation (16). Q.E.D. 
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2.2  Goods and labor markets equilibrium 
 
Each firm produces a differentiated good and the monopolistic firm operates under Equation 
(1). Each firm sets its price to the good in order to maximize its share value subject to Equation 
(3). In addition, we assume nominal rigidities such that the price of each good is set in advance. 
That is, the selling price of a good in period t, that is 
tp , is set in the period 1t  subject to 
Equation (3). Then, the optimal price-setting rule for the firms is 
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 , 
where   is a constant gross mark-up, and ttWp is the nominal marginal cost.  
Each good market clears when )()( iCiY tt   for all  1,0i  in all periods .t  Denoting aggregate 
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11
0
11
)(









 
e
e
e
tt diiYY  
indicates together with Equation (1) that the aggregate goods market clearing condition reads 
tt CY  .      (19) 
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This indicates that the aggregate net profits is tttt DY   , where tD  is the aggregate 
dividend.  The labor market clears when 
tttt YdiiYdiiNG   )()(
1
0
1
0
 .    (20) 
This indicates that all firms set identical prices and produce same quantities in the symmetric 
equilibrium. Then, the supply of the aggregate output is equal to t , which is non-stationary 
because of the assumption of flexible labor supply with non-stationary exogenous technology 
of Equation (2). Under flexible goods prices, that is if the firms can set the goods price when 
they observe t , the optimal price setting implies constant real wage 


1
tW . 
Thus, under sticky goods prices at the symmetric equilibrium, optimal price setting can be 
written as 
tt uW 


1 ,    (21) 
where tu  is the martingale difference with 0)(1  tt uE . In addition, from the income side  
t
o
tt WwY  ,     (22) 
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where o
tw is the aggregate investing wealth of the old households before consuming. Using 
Equations (21) and (22), the equilibrium production reads 
t
o
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which is a martingale process with drift 
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1  in the optimum price setting. Then using 
Equations (19), (20) and (23) we have a general equilibrium  
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indicating that all main variables in the equilibrium except the real wage are non-stationary. In 
addition, there is a martingale difference 0)(1  tt uE  that reacts with a lag to 
G
ttt eGG  1lnln . Whereas under perfectly flexible goods prices we have an equilibrium 

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1o
tttt wCY  . Thus, if the firms could set their prices with the knowledge of ,
G
te the 
inflation would be at the steady state .  Hence, the exogenous shock Gte creates  t , 
because the firms must decide the price of their goods before the shock emerges. In addition, 
because of asymmetric information in the stock markets, the exogenous shock Gte creates 
bubbles into the risky assets.  
2.3  The central bank 
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Recall that the technology shock follows G
ttt eGG 11 lnln   , where ),0(~
2
G
G
t WNe  , that the 
non-stationary aggregate net profits ttt Y   are paid out as the aggregate dividend tD .Then 
it is obvious that the conditional expected dividend ttt DDE  )( 1 is not equal to the realized
1tD . However, we assume that informed investors and the central bank have private 
information about future performance of aggregate firms such that they are able to observe 1tD  
in advance. Hence, Equation (12), 
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equilibrium price. The central bank aims to maximize the aggregate utility of all households. 
Therefore, the task of the central bank is to eliminate any bubbles in the financial market by 
using monetary policy to adjust the risk-free rate of return.  
The central bank sets the nominal risk-free rate fn
tr according to the rule 
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where 
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p
 denotes gross inflation,   is the inflation target, and )1( rtr  is the gross real 
risk-free rate. This rule assures that the real interest rate reacts to the changes in inflation with 
strength 0 . In Equation (25), 1


t
t  refers to a positive bubble in the stock market. The 
proof of Proposition assures that 0A  in Equation (25).  Thus, a rise in the nominal risk-free 
rate deinflates the stock market bubble. 
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In the alternative case of the uninformed investors acting as technical traders, the last 
component in Equation (25) is 
t
t
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, where   tttrufnttt DPrVP   12 )1()1( . 
Then  1
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t  refers to a positive bubble in the stock market. The proof of  Corollary assures 
that 0A  in Equation (25) within the reasonable regime  
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The goal of the central bank is to maximize households’ welfare in each period. It is clear that 
asymmetric information about the fundamental value of the stock market among households is 
the key issue concerning the welfare of the aggregate households. Because informed households 
are able to calculate the non-bubble stock market price they make right investing decisions. 
Hence, the uninformed households tend to make mistakes in their investing decisions resulting 
larger variance in their consumption when they are old compared to the informed households’ 
variance. Thus, the goal of the central bank is to minimize the difference of variances between 
informed and uninformed households by following Equation (25) with 0A .  
3  Conclusions 
 
The paper presents a general equilibrium model where the central bank knows that infinite 
bubbles in the stock markets are impossible, and where one proportion of households observes 
the real value of the aggregate stock markets while the others are uninformed about it. 
Furthermore, investing in the financial markets offer the only way to the households to 
maximize their life-time wealth and thus consumption. Taken that infinite bubbles are 
impossible, the central bank must stabilize the bubble in order to save uninformed households 
from suffering from the eventual burst of the bubble. Hence, the goal of the central bank is both 
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to stabilize the stock market bubbles and to keep inflation in the steady state in order to 
maximize the aggregate life-time real incomes of the households.  
We find that that if the risk-free rate rises/falls, the equilibrium price in the stock markets 
reduces/increases, ceteris paribus. In contrast to Gali (2014), we prove the working of the 
leaning against the wind policy in the stock markets. It is clear that our results depend on several 
key assumptions and hence the proof is valid only when they are fulfilled.  
 
First, following Gali (2014), an OLG model is used to facilitate the development of a stock 
market bubble in the first place. The assumption is reasonable with short investing periods and 
frequent monitoring of the investors’ performance. Second, we assume that only a portion of 
the risk-averse investors recognizes the true value of the stock market in every period. Thus, 
there is more room for a bubble to develop, because all investors do not simply observe that the 
stock markets are overvalued. This differs from the model of Gali, because in his model the 
bubble is a rational bubble that grows with the risk-free rate. In our set-up, rapid growth of an 
irrational bubble is possible, if the uninformed investors act as technical traders. This is because 
the discounting factor is missing in their pricing rule. Third, in contrast to standard 
macroeconomics equilibrium models, we have a non-stationary production technology that 
makes every main component non-stationary in the equilibrium as well. Thus, the random 
walking technology produces permanent changes in the equilibria. And last, we assume that the 
central bank observes the true value of the aggregate stock market. 
 
The main contribution of the paper is to show that the leaning against the wind policy in the 
stock markets works, if the risk-averse investors have a short investing period and asymmetric 
information about the fundamental value of the stock market, if the central bank observes the 
19 
 
infinitely impossible bubble, and if the technology of the firms follows a non-stationary process. 
Moreover, if the uninformed investors act as technical traders, the central bank is urged to 
prevent super bubble to develop. 
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